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) STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
DR. SIMPSON GRAY, 
Charging Party, 
:-— CASE NO. U-28282 
- and -
UNITED FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, 
Respondent, • 
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY SCHOOL 
DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, 
Employer. 
>> DR. SIMPSON GRAY, pro se 
ROBERT E. WATERS, ESQ. (SETH J. BLAU of counsel), for Respondent 
Board of Education of the City School District of the City of New York 
JAMES R. SANDNER, GENERAL COUNSEL (WENDY M. STAR of counsel), 
for Respondent United Federation of Teachers 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
On July 28, 2008, Dr. Simpson Gray (Gray) filed a motion, pursuant to §212.4(h) 
of the Rules of Procedure (Rules) for leave to file exceptions to the Board challenging a 
pre-heanngi ruljng[ofan Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), dated 
to process a second amendment to Gray's improper practice charge alleging that the 
United Federation of Teachers (UFT) violated §209-a.2(c) of the Act. 
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FACTS 
On or about April 11, 2008, Gray filed an improper practice charge alleging that 
UFT violated §209-a.2(c) on the grounds that only two of his fifteen grievances, filed 
since 2006, have been heard and that decisions have not been issued with respect to 
those two grievances. Consistent with §209-a.3 of the Act, the Board of Education of 
the City School District of the City of New York (District) is a statutory party to the 
improper practice charge. 
On April 15, 2008, the Director of Public Employment Practices and 
Representation (Director) sent Gray a letter stating that his charge would not be 
processed due to deficiencies outlined in an attached notice. The Director's notice 
stated: 
/ You need to clearly and concisely identify the acts of the 
union that you allege constitute the violation, with facts 
sufficient to arguably establish each act as arbitrary, 
discriminatory or in bad faith. You need to include names, 
dates times, places and other facts. 
In response to the deficiency notice, Gray filed, on or about April 24, 2008, an 
amended pleading with the Director entitled "Amended Verified Complaint." Consistent 
with the Director's deficiency notice, Gray's amended pleading set forth specific 
allegations of actions arid inactions by the UFT that Gray asserts violate §209-a.2(c) of 
the Act. Additionally, the amended pleading added the District and a UFT 
representative as named respondents and alleged that the District violated §§202 and 
209-a.1 (a)(c) and (d) of the Act by refusing to meet with him with respect to his 20 
grievances and for violating the terms of the District-UFT collectively negotiated 
j agreement (agreement). 
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On May 5, 2008, the Director issued a notice scheduling a conference on June 5, 
2008 before an ALJ. In his May 5, 2008 notice, the Director informed Gray that although 
his allegations against UFT were being processed, the allegations against the District in 
his amended pleading would not be processed "because no charge was filed against it 
— —and the faets-pled-are insufficientto base-a violation of-the Act^against-the employer^ 
Both UFT and the District filed answers to Gray's amended charge. 
Without seeking leave from the Director or the assigned ALJ, on or about May 25, 
2008, Gray filed a second amended pleading, entitled "Second Amended Verified 
Complaint and Charge", containing seven numbered "counts" and 50 numbered 
paragraphs of allegations against UFT and the District along with 24 pages of exhibits. In 
Count 6, Gray alleges that Article 22B1 (b) of the District-UFT agreement violates the Act 
( \ ' • • ' . . . . - . - ' . . . . '. • • • • . - . . . . . . 
J
 because it grants UFT the sole discretion to process a grievance beyond Step 1. Both 
UFT and the District opposed the processing of Gray's second amendment. 
Following a June 17, 2008 conference with the parties, the ALJ issued a ruling, 
in letter form, dated June 24, 2008, concluding that Gray's second amended pleading 
was deficient and, therefore, it would not be processed. In her ruling, the ALJ 
confirmed that at the conference Gray acknowledged that the allegations in Counts 1, 2 
and 3 were a mere repetition of the allegations contained in his first amended pleading. 
""" In additJonrthe ALJ ruled that : 
1. Count i's allegations against the District had already been 
u d i c i i i i n i c u i u u o U C I I ^ I C I U uy m o U I I C V I U I 111 1110 iviay \j, i u u u 
notice; 
2, The allegations in Count 2 and 3 are substantially the same 
} as the allegations contained in the first amended pleading; 
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.3. Counts 4, 5 and 6 allege facts that do not constitute an 
improper practice under the Act and are untimely pursuant 
to§204.1(a)(1)oftheRules; 
4. Count 7 is deficient because an individual lacks standing to 
allege a violation of §209-a.1 (d) and because the allegations 
had already been determined to be deficient by the Director 
in his May 5, 2008 notice. 
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE EXCEPTIONS 
In his motion for leave to file exceptions/Gray contends that extraordinary 
circumstances exist warranting the Board to grant his motion. We disagree. 
The purported extraordinary circumstances cited by Gray in support of his motion 
include: a) the alleged repudiation of the agreement by UFT and the District by failing to 
process his numerous grievances; b) UFT's failure to enforce a stipulation of 
settlement; c) the ALJ's ruling is contrary to the Act because, according to Gray, the 
failure to perform the terms of an agreement constitutes a violation of the Act; d) the 
second amended pleading cured the deficiencies found by the Director with respect to 
the first amended pleading; e) the ALJ misconstrued the allegations in the second 
amended pleading; and f) the allegations in the second amended pleading are timely 
and state facts constituting an improper practice under the Act. 
Both UFT and the District oppose Gray's motion for leave to file exceptions. 
DISCUSSION 
Section 212.4(h) of the Rules states, in relevant part, that: 
"All motions and rulings made at the hearing shall be part of 
the record of the proceeding, and unless expressly 
authorized by the board, shall not be appealed directly to 
the board, but shall be considered by the board whenever 
' - the case is submitted to it for decision." 
Case No. U-28282 -5-
Under well-established precedent, the Board will not grant leave to file 
exceptions to non-final rulings and decisions unless the moving party demonstrates 
extraordinary circumstances.1 The reasoning underlying the extraordinary 
circumstances standard is the recognition that it is far more efficient for the Board and 
— - t h e parties4o await-a final disposition of4he-merits-of a-charge befere examining-interim 
determinations. The improvident grant of leave results in unnecessary delays in the 
final resolution of the factual and legal issues raised by an improper practice charge or 
representation petition. As a result, the Board has consistently rejected most requests 
for permission to file exceptions, especially motions seeking review of interim rulings in 
improper practice cases.2 In contrast, as we stated in State of New York (Division of 
Parole),3 the Board has been more willing to grant leave to file interlocutory exceptions 
^ in cases involving representation cases, under the extraordinary circumstances 
standard, when: 
the issue raised in the motion for leave has important 
statewide policy or legal implications for the processing of 
future representation petitions, may help insure procedural 
certainty in such.processing or where our decision may 
1
 Mt Morris Cent Sch Dist, 26 PERB 1J3085 (1993); Greenburgh No 11 Union Free Sch 
Dist, 28 PERB P034 (1995); Town of Shawangunk, 29 PERB H3050 (1996); New York 
State Housing Finance Agency, 30 PERB 1J3022 (1997); Council 82, AFSCME, 32 
PERB 1J3040 (1999); Watertown City Sen Dist, 32 PERB P022 (1999); UFT (Grassel), 
32 PERB U3071 (1999); City of Newburgh, 33 PERB K3031 (2000); State of New York 
(Division of Parole), 40 PERB 1J3007 (2007). 
2
 Town of Shawangunk, supra, note 1. 
3
 Supra, note 1. 
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obviate the need for further processing of the petition. 
In the present case, Gray seeks leave to file exceptions to challenge the ALJ's 
refusal to permit him to file a second amended pleading with respect to his improper 
practice charge. As we recently reiterated in City of Elmira,5 an ALJ, in general, is 
granted-considerable disGretion-with-respect to the processing of-anHmproper-practice— 
charge. 
Pursuant to §204.1 (d) of the Rules, the Director or an ALJ is granted the 
discretion to determine whether a party may amend a pleading. Section 204.1(d) of the 
Rules states: 
The director or administrative law judge designated by the 
director may permit a charging party to amend the charge 
before, during or after the conclusion of the hearing upon 
^ such terms as may be deemed just and consistent with due 
J
 process. 
Consistent with §204.1(d) of the Rules, we conclude that extraordinary 
circumstances do not exist in the present case to grant Gray leave to file exceptions 
because he has not demonstrated that the ALJ's interim ruling has resulted or will 
necessarily result in-a denial of due process or undue prejudice. Gray's motion is 
primarily a repetition of his various pleadings combined with an exposition with respect 
to his disagreement with the ALJ's legal conclusions. Such factual and legal issues are 
best determined on exceptions from the finMdispositibn of the charge. 
Based upon the foregoing, we deny Gray's motion for leave to file exceptions 
440PERBat3019. 
) 541 PERBP018(2008). 
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and remand the case to the ALJ for further processing consistent with this decision. 
SO ORDERED 
DATED: September 24, 2008 
Albany, New York 
lAcrvrtf. 
Jerome Lefkowjfc, Chairman 
A A<tAtj 
tS T*T7 
Robert S. Hite, Member 
o 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYEES UNION, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-26761 
COUNTY OF COLUMBIA, 
Respondent. 
LAW OFFICES OF RICHARD M. GREENSPAN, P.C. (THOMAS 
RUBERSTONE, JR. of counsel), for Charging Party 
ROEMER WALLENS & MINEAUX LLP (WILLIAM M. WALLENS, of 
counsel), for Respondent 
) BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to the Board on exceptions filed by the County of Columbia 
(County) to a decision by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on a charge filed by United 
Public Service Employees Union (UPSEU) finding that the County violated §209-a.1 (d) 
of the Public Employees1 Fair Employment Act (Act) when it unilaterally created a new 
4:00 am-12:30 pm shift for cleaning County buildings and unilaterally assigned a 
member of the UPSEU bargaining unit to work that shift.1 In reaching her decision, the 
ALJ dismissed theCounty'sf duty "satisfaction" and waiver defenses pled in its answer. 
1
 41 PERB U4533 (2008). 
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EXCEPTIONS 
In its exceptions, the County contends that the ALJ erred in her interpretation of 
the parties' collectively negotiated agreement, in dismissing the County's duty 
satisfaction and waiver defense, and in finding that the County violated §209-a.1(d) of 
the Act when it established the 4:00 am-12:30 pm shift and assigned a UPSEU 
bargaining-unitrmember-to-t-hat-shift- In additionHhe Gounty-Ghallenges-the ALJ^s-
proposed remedial order. UPSEU supports the ALJ's decision and remedial order. 
FACTS 
In lieu of a hearing, the parties submitted to the ALJ a stipulation of facts along 
with eight exhibits, including the parties' 2004-2007 collectively negotiated agreement 
(agreement). UPSEU is the certified employee organization representing various 
County employees, including building maintenance workers in the Department of Public 
Works Facilities Division. 
Article II, entitled "Compensation", includes negotiated provisions with respect to 
premium pay and overtime pay. Article II, §§5(a), 5(c)(2) and 5(c)(4) refers to bargaining 
unit members working in shifts: 
a. Shift Differential 
All employees at the Pine Haven Home and the Night watch 
person in the Department of Public Works working in shifts 
other than the day shift shall receive shift differential of $.75 
per hour. Effective January 1, 2005, the shift differential 
shall increase to $1.00 per hour. 
c. Overtime Pay 
(2) Employees' regular daily shift schedules will not be 
u n a t i ^ v / u I W I u i o C A U I O O O [ j u i p w o ^ \_/i Q V U I U I I I ^ u v u i L I M I ^ 
payments. 
. (4) Employees who are scheduled to work overtime on a 
regular scheduled shift such as scheduled night hours and 
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evening hours in the DMV shall be entitled to receive 
overtime at time and one-half the hourly rate of pay for hours 
in excess of eight (8) hours in one shift. 
With respect to the distribution of overtime, Article II, §5(d)(4)(e) makes reference to a 
normal work day: 
(e) During hours outside the normal work day (4:00 p.m. to 7:30 
a.m.) and weekends and holidays, employees will be called 
in for dutyin accordance with paragraph 4(b) and^ other-—— — 
employees of the Highway Department may be activated 
depending upon the need of the Department at the time of 
the snow and ice incident. 
Article III of the agreement, entitled "Work Day, Workweek" states: 
a. Normal Work Day - Work Week 
The normal work week for all employees of the County of 
Columbia shall not in any event be in excess of forty (40) 
hours, consisting of five (5) consecutive days not in excess 
of eight (8) hours per day. Employees shall have two 
consecutive twenty-four hour days, a total of forty-eight 
consecutive hours off each week. Except in the event of 
emergencies and field employees, employees shall finish 
their work day at the place it began. This provision shall not 
affect employees at Pine Haven House. 
Employees who normally work a 35 hour week and who are 
required to work in excess of 35 hours shall receive their 
regular hourly rate of pay up to 40 hours per week. Time 
worked in excess of forty hours shall be at the rate of time 
and one half the regular hourly rate. 
The County agrees that the current scheduling practice on 
Thursdays only in the Department of Motor Vehicles will 
continue for the duration of this Agreement. Thursday 
evening hours at the Department of Motor Vehicles and 
Mental Health shall be suspended when Friday is celebrated 
as a holiday. However, the County reserves the right, to 
i c u u u c ui c i i i i i i i icuc ii io o o i i o u u i i i i y y i a u u b c n i u i o 
Department of Motor Vehicles on Thursdays. Nothing herein 
shall be construed to reduce or comprise the County's right 
as an employer. 
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b. Paving Crew 
•\ Designated employees in the Highway Department will work 
on a voluntary basis for ten hour days per week at straight 
time wages in the summertime on the paving crew. 
c. Pine Haven 
The County agrees to guarantee every other weekend off for 
Pine Haven Home employees. 
d. Change in Schedule 
— —The Gounty-may-establish new or-alter-existing-work days or--
work weeks, upon fourteen (14) calendar days notice, except 
in an emergency, to the Union and affected employees. This 
shall not be a waiver of any Taylor Law right of the Union to 
demand impact negotiations. 
Article XVII, entitled "County's Right As An Employer", states, in part: 
The County retains all of its rights as Employer, including, 
but not limited to, the right to assign work as required, 
including that which requires overtime, the right to supervise 
as required and the right to discipline where necessary, 
subject to the provision of this provision of this Agreement, 
\ the Civil Service law of the State of New York, and any other 
./'.. Federal, State of [sic] Local Laws. 
On January 30, 2006, the County met with UPSEU and various UPSEU 
bargaining unit members to discuss the County's intention to change the shift for 
employees assigned to clean County buildings. Among those present at the meeting 
were building maintenance workers Frank Wright (Wright) and Ronald Seymour 
(Seymour). Both Wright and Seymour are assigned to the County's public safety 
building and, at the time, worked 7:30 am to 4:00 pm. 
During the meeting, the County announced its unilateral decision to change the 
cleaning assignments in the public safety building to 4:00 am to 12:30 pm. However, the 
County indicated that it did not need both Wright and Seymour to work the new shift and 
requested they submit their respective preferences with respect to the new shift. In 
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addition, they were informed that if they both wanted to work the new shift, the County 
would consider an alternating work schedule. Both Wright and Seymour were also given 
letters, dated January 30, 2006, from the County informing them that, pursuant to Article 
lll(d) of the agreement, their work schedule would be 4:00 am to12:30 pm, commencing 
on March 1, 2006. After Wright and Seymour did not respond with their preferences, the 
County-informed Wright that,-effective-Eebruary-2Z,2006,his new shift would-be 4:00am 
to 12:30 pm and Seymour was notified that his shift would remain unchanged. 
On or about February 28, 2006, the County changed the work hours of Wright, 
laborer Louise Sacco and cleaners Terry Guntert, Barton Hover and William Hughes to 
4:00 am to 12:30 pm. On March 21, 2006 and April 17, 2006, UPSEU sent letters to the 
County questioning the procedures it utilized in making the changes to the shift 
assignment. In response, the County offered to meet to discuss UPSEU's concerns. 
DISCUSSION 
In its exceptions, the County asserts that the ALJ erred in her interpretation of the 
plain language of the parties' agreement, resulting in the erroneous rejection of the 
County's duty satisfaction and waiver defenses. We disagree. 
In New York City Transit Authority,2 the Board recently reaffirmed the principle 
that when parties have bargained a specific subject to completion and have entered into 
an agreement with respect to that subject, an employer has satisfied its duty to 
negotiate and does not" act unilaterally, iii violation of thei Act,"when it: takes'"ah" action" 
2
 41 PERB P014 (2008); see also, City of Albany, 41 PERB fl3019 (2008). 
Case No. U-26761 -6-
that is permitted under the specifically negotiated term of the agreement.3 However, the 
burden rests with the respondent to both plead and prove a duty satisfaction defense 
through negotiated terms that are reasonably clear on the specific subject at issue.4 
In order to prevail on a waiver defense, a respondent must plead and prove that 
an agreement contains a provision that constitutes a "clear, unmistakable and 
unambiguous'1 waiver of-the-eharging-partyVrighHo negotiate a mandatory subject 
under the Act.5 
In determining whether an agreement contains a provision that satisfies a 
respondent's duty to negotiate or a waiver of a charging party's right to negotiate a 
mandatory subject, the Board will apply standard principles of contract interpretation.6 
When applying such principles, our aim is to discern the parties' intent by giving a 
practical interpretation to the language utilized. When the contract language is clear 
and unambiguous, evidence outside the four cornersof the agreement will not be 
3
 See also, County of Nassau, 31 PERB1J3064 (1998); County of Nassau 31 PERB 
H3074 (1998); State of New York (Workers' Compensation Board), 32 NYPER1J3076 
(1999). 
4
 NYCTA, 20 PERB 1J3037 (1987), confd, 147 AD2d 574, 22 PERB 1J7001 (2d Dept 
1989); Town of Shawangunk, 32 PERB P042 (1999); County of Sullivan and Sullivan 
County Sheriff, 41 PERB 1J3006 (2008); City of Oswego, 41 PERB1J3011 (2008). 
5
 CSEA v Newman, 88 AD2d 685, 15 PERB 1J7011 (3d Dept 1982), app dismissed, 57 
NY2d 775, 15 PERB fl7020 (1982) affd, 61 NY2d 1001, 17 PERB fl7007 (1984) 
(subsequent history omitted). See also, County of Saratoga and Saratoga County 
Sheriff, 37 PERB P024 (2004) rev, County of Saratoga v New York State Pub Empl 
RelBd, 21 AD3d 1160, 38 PERB 1J7013 (3d Dept 2005); City of Yonkers, 40 PERB 
TC3001 (2007); MABSTOA, 40 PERB 1J3023 (2007); State of New York-Unified Court 
System, 41 PERB 1J3009 (2008). 
6
 NYCTA, supra note 2; County of Livingston, 30 PERB P046 (1997). See also, 
Bomstein, Gosline, Greenbaum, Labor and Employment Arbitration, 2ded, Ch. 9 
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considered. However, where the language is susceptible to more than one reasonable 
interpretation, extrinsic evidence, such as negotiation history and/or a past practice, is 
admissible to clarify the ambiguity and thereby effectuate the intent of the parties. For 
example, in New York City Transit Authority,7 we sustained a duty satisfaction defense 
based on parol evidence in the record despite the fact that the relevant contract 
provision was-suseeptible to more than one reasonable-interpretation^-— 
In the present case, the County argues that the clear and unambiguous language 
contained in Articles III and XVII demonstrates that, contrary to the ALJ's conclusion, 
the parties reached an agreement with respect to the establishment and modification of 
employee shifts along with the procedures for assigning bargaining unit employees to 
such shifts. The County relies upon dictionary definitions of certain contractual terms to 
support its contention that the phrase "work day," as used in Article lll(a) and (d), is 
synonymous with an eight hour shift and that Article lll(d) expressly authorizes the 
County to both establish and alter such shifts. In addition, the County argues that it has 
the right to determine when an eight hour shift begins and ends because it is granted 
"the right to assign work as required" under Article XVII. 
While the use of dictionary definitions can constitute a proper means for 
interpreting the terms of an agreement aimed at discerning the parties' intent, we find 
the use of that interpretive tool to be unhelpful in the present case. Based upon the 
specific, but varying, terms and phrases utilized by the parties in various sections of the 
agreement, we conclude that the agreement is not reasonably clear on the subject 
matter at issue. 
7
 Supra, note 2. 
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Article II, §§5(a), 5(c)(2) and 5(c)(4) of the agreement utilize relevant phrases 
such as "shifts other than the day shift," "regular daily shift schedules" and "regularly 
scheduled shift," but the agreement is silent with respect to the definition of those 
phrases including identifying the specific hours, if any, for each referenced shift. 
The ambiguity with respect to what constitutes a shift under the agreement is 
eompounded-by the-parties-use of the phrase-"normal-work day-in-Artiele llT-§5(d)(4)(e) 
rather than continuing to make reference to a shift. Although Article II, §5(d)(4)(e) does 
not affirmatively define the phrase "normal work day," a definition can be inferred from 
the description of the period 4:00 pm to 7:30 am as being "hours outside the normal 
work day." The hours defined as being "outside the normal work day" in Article II 
suggests that the remaining eight and one-half hours of a day, 7:30 am to 4:00 pm, 
constitutes a "normal work day" for bargaining unit members. However, even if we 
conclude that the hours of a "normal work day" are implicitly defined in Article II, it 
remains unclear whether those same hours are intended to be applicable for a "day 
shift," "daily shift" or the other shifts referred to in Article II. 
We next turn to Article III, where Article ll's implicit definition of the hours of a 
"normal work day" may have relevance. The subheading for Article lll(a) is "Normal 
Work Day - Work Week." Despite the subheading, the text of Article lll(a) and (d) refers 
only to a "work day," without the modifying term "normal", rendering it uncertain whether 
a "work day" is Intended to be synonymous with a "normaTwork day" or a shift, or is 
intended to have a different meaning such as the days of the week when an employee 
will perform assigned duties. There is an internal inconsistency between Article II, 
15(d)(4)(e), which implicitly defines a "normal work day" as an eight and one-half hour . 
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day, while Article lll(a) defines a "work day" as not in excess of eight hours. Moreover, 
the reference to undefined "Thursday evening hours," in Article lll(a), for the 
Departments of Motor Vehicles and Mental Health, exacerbates the difficulties in 
rendering a reasonable interpretation of the agreement. 
Based on the inconsistent, if not contradictory, terminology in Articles II and III of 
the agreemenVweare unable to conclude thaUhe-agreement-is-reasonably-Glear-that 
the parties reached an agreement with respect to the establishment and modification of 
employee daily work hours and the procedures for assigning bargaining unit employees 
to those hours. 
Alternatively, even if we found the agreement to be reasonably clear, we would 
conclude, based on the inconsistencies in the terminology, that the agreement is 
susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation. For example, Article lll(d) can 
be reasonably interpreted to afford the County the prerogative of changing the number 
of hours in a work day, which is not the same as changing the time of shifts within the 
work day. Therefore, in order to sustain the County's duty satisfaction defense, the 
record would have to include sufficient extrinsic evidence to support the County's 
contractually based defense. However, the stipulated record does not include any parol 
evidence to aid in construing the agreement. 
In addition, we reject the County's waiver argument, premised on Articles lll(d) 
and XVII. Article NI(d) of thei agreement: grants the Court 
work days" as long as it provides the requisite 14 day notice to UPSEU and affected 
employees. The text of Article lll(d) does not explicitly grant the County the authority to 
alter shifts or even the hours of a normal work day. At best, it permits the County to 
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determine which days of the week, and the number of hours, bargaining unit members 
are to perform their job duties. 
Similarly, the authority of the County to assign work, under Article XVII, permits 
the County to determine the particular duties to be performed by bargaining unit 
employees. The ability to assign work cannot be reasonably construed as constituting 
authority-tomodify4he hoursworked.-We concludethattheagreement doesnotcontain^ 
a clear, unmistakable and unambiguous waiver by UPSEU of the right to negotiate over 
the establishment and modification of shifts and the procedures for assigning bargaining 
unit employees to those shifts. 
Therefore, we deny the County's challenge to the ALJ's interpretation of the 
agreement to the extent that she concluded that the terms of the agreement are 
insufficient to support the County's duty satisfaction and waiver defenses. 
\ ' . ' . . - • . ' 
) We also deny the County's exception challenging the ALJ's conclusion that the 
County violated §209-a.1 (d) of the Act when it unilaterally created the new shift and 
assigned Wright to work the shift. It is well-settled that shifts, tours of duties and work 
schedules, in general, constitute mandatory subjects of bargaining under the Act as 
long as they do not interfere with an employer's prerogative with respect to staffing.8 
Finally, we examine the County's exception challenging the ALJ's remedial order 
that the County rescind the new 4:00 am to 12:30 pm shift for cleaning County 
buildings, rescind its order"that Wright workTthatshiftand make UPSEU represehted 
employees, if any, whole for any wages and benefits lost, with interest at the maximum 
legal rate, as a result of the County's improper practice. Contrary to the County's 
8
 City of New York, 40 PERBV01712007). 
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argument, in remedying an improper practice, under §205.5(d) of the Act, the Board is 
not limited or constrained by a remedy proposed by a charging party. In addition, we 
are not persuaded by the County's argument that the remedial order constitutes an 
enforcement of the parties'agreement. 
Based on the foregoing, we find that the County violated §209- a.1 (d) of the Act 
when-it-unilaterally-ereated-the4T0O am-to-12v30 pm-shift-for-eleaning-Gounty buildings— 
and unilaterally assigned a member of the UPSEU bargaining unit to work that shift. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the County shall: 
1. Rescind its directive establishing the 4:00 am to 12:30 pm shift and its order that 
Frank Wright work that shift; 
2. Make UPSEU represented employees whole for wages and benefits lost, if any, 
by virtue of the County's unilateral actions, plus interest at the maximum legal 
rate and; 
3. Sign and post the attached notice at all locations customarily used to post notices 
to unit employees. 
DATED: September 24, 2008 
Albany, New York 
JMlK-
Jerome Lefkowitz/^haipma 
/ufA/^l^r'-. 
Robert S. Hife' MemBer 
NOTICE TO ALL 
EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees of the County of Columbia in the unit represented 
by the United Public Service Employees Union that the County will: 
1. Rescind its directive establishing the 4:00 am to 12:30 pm shift 
and its order that Frank Wright work that shift and; 
2. Make UPSEU represented employees whole for wages and 
benefits lost, if any, by virtue of the County's unilateral actions, 
plus interest at the maximum legal rate. 
Dated By 
(Representative) (Title) 
County of Columbia 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and 
must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
VICTOR MALTSEV, 
Charging Party, 
CASE NO. U-27372 
-and-— 
DISTRICT COUNCIL 37, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Respondent, 
- and -
NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY, 
Employer. 
VICTOR MALTSEV, pro se 
EDDIE M. DEMMINGS, GENERAL COUNSEL (ROBIN ROACH, of counsel), 
for Respondent 
MARTIN B. SCHNABEL, GENERAL COUNSEL (MICHELE L. SHERIDAN, of 
counsel), for Employer 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to the Board on exceptions by Victor Maltsev (Maltsev) to a 
decision of an Administrative Law Judge dismissing an improper practice charge filed by 
Maltsev, on February 8, 2007, alleging that District Council 37, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (DC 
37) violated §209-a.2(c) of the Public Emn!ovees' Fair Employment Act fAct^ when it 
refused to process a grievance to arbitration and based on its alleged failure to respond 
to his inquiries with respect to the grievance.1 
DC 37 filed an answer that denied it violated the Act and affirmatively alleged that 
Maltsev had retired from employment with the New York City Transit Authority (NYCTA) 
almost two years before filing the charge and that the charge was untimely. NYCTA, as 
a statutory party pursuant to §209-a.3 of the Act, filed an answer that also raised 
-timeliness as-anaffirmative-defense —, 
Following a hearing on December 11, 2007, the ALJ issued a decision dismissing 
the charge concluding that Maltsev, as a retiree, is not a public employee under PERB's 
Rules of Procedure (Rules), §204.1 (a)(1) and therefore lacks standing to file the charge. 
In the alternative, the ALJ concluded that Maltsev's allegations are untimely under 
§204.1(a)(1) of the Rules and that they lack substantive merit. 
EXCEPTIONS 
\ 
J In his exceptions, Maltsev contends that the ALJ made both errors of law and 
fact in dismissing the charge. Specifically, he asserts that the ALJ erred, as a matter of 
law, in concluding that that he lacks standing to pursue the charge. In addition, he 
contends that the ALJ misconstrued the evidence in the record when she concluded 
that the charge lacks merit and is untimely. DC 37 and NYCTA support the ALJ's 
decision. 
Based upon our review of the record, consideration.of the parties' arguments and 
application of relevant" preced'e^f," we graht"Ma1tse '^s~exceptibhs7 in part, but affinrfthe 
ALJ's dismissal of the charge. 
41 PERB'il4542 (2008)." 
FACTS 
Prior to March 1, 2005, Maltsev was employed by NYCTA. In a letter, dated 
January 27, 2005, he requested DC 37, Local 375, Chapter 2 Grievance Chair George 
Dames (Dames) to initiate a grievance on his behalf challenging NYCTA's failure to 
comply with the timeframes, set forth in NYCTA's employee suggestion policy and 
procedure,for responding to employeesuggestions-and appeals. This non-contractual 
policy and procedure permits employees to propose suggestions to NYCTA aimed at 
improving its operations. An employee wishing to submit a suggestion is required to 
agree to a number of explicit conditions including: 
I agree that any decision by NYC Transit concerning this 
suggestion,including but not limited to whether I am eligible 
to participate in the Employee Suggestion Program, whether 
or not to use the suggestion, and whether or not I receive an 
award for the suggestion, is final and binding. I agree that 
my submission of the suggestion to NYC Transit will not give 
rise to any claim of any nature whatsoever against NYC 
Transit on the part of myself, my heirs or my assigns. 
Under the policy and procedure, if an employee's suggestion is adopted by 
NYCTA, an employee may be entitled to a monetary award if the adopted suggestion 
leads to, inter alia, budgetary savings, increased revenue, improved safety and/or 
improved NYCTA services. If an employee suggestion is rejected, an employee may 
file a written appeal requesting a reevaluation. If dissatisfied with the outcome of the 
reevaiuation, the employee may appeal to a NYCTA committee which determines the 
appeal in a final and binding decision. 
On February 25, 2005, DC 37 filed a Step 1 grievance on behalf of Maltsev.2 A 
few days later, Maltsev retired from NYCTA employment. Thereafter, DC 37 processed 
the grievance consistent with the procedures of the parties' collectively negotiated 
agreement. On May 2, 2006, Dames requested that the DC 37 Legal Department 
process the grievance to arbitration. Following a review of the grievance, the DC 37 
LegaLDepartment,-on-May-8,-2006, issuedamemorandum-statingthatithad 
determined that the grievance lacked merit and therefore should not be processed to 
arbitration. 
It is undisputed that Maltsev received a copy of the DC 37 Legal Department 
memorandum in May 2006. Thereafter, no one from DC 37 advised him that his 
grievance would be proceeding to arbitration. Between June 2006 and September 2006, 
Maltsev made attempts at contacting various DC 37 representatives with respect to its 
"A . . . . . . 
J refusal to pursue the grievance at arbitration. These efforts included July 2006 letters to 
DC 37 Local 375 President Claude Fort (Fort) and Dames, numerous telephone calls, 
as well as unscheduled visits to DC 37 headquarters to discuss the grievance with DC 
37 representatives. According to Maltsev, DC 37 representatives refused to respond to 
him about the grievance. 
The record reveals that on August 21, 2006, Maltsev had a brief conversation 
2
 Although the employee suggestion policy and procedure is not incorporated into the 
parties' collectively negotiated agreement, the agreement permits the filing of 
grievances for violations, misinterpretation or misapplication of "any written working 
conditions, rule or resolution of the Authority governing or affecting its employees...." 
Union Ex. 1, Art: Vf(A). """ •"""'"•'"""•'."'T"T 
with DC 37 Assistant Director Maynard Anderson (Anderson) at DC 37 headquarters. 
During the conversation, Maltsev complained about Fort's failure to respond to 
Maltsev's numerous inquiries about the grievance, and Anderson agreed to investigate 
the status of the grievance. Maltsev testified that he sent a letter to Anderson, dated 
September 6, 2006, requesting the results of Anderson's investigation. During his 
testimony,Jioweverr Anderson stated that he did-notreceive Maltsev-sJetter 
In August, September and October 2006, Maltsev also communicated by letter 
and email with DC 37's Ethical Practices Officer J. Bruce Maffeo (Maffeo) on the issue 
of Fort's alleged failure to respond to Maltsev's inquiries about the grievance. On 
October 17, 2006, Maffeo sent a letter to Maltsev summarizing their communications to 
date including Maffeo's September 7, 2006 email suggesting that Maltsev proceed with 
his complaint alleging that Fort failed to respond to his inquiries about the grievance. 
On January 25, 2007, following his inquiry into the status of Maltsev's grievance, 
Anderson sent a letter to Maltsev stating: 
I am attaching hereto a copy of a memorandum from our DC 
37 Legal Department to Local 375 Chapter 2, Transit 
Authority grievance representative George Dames, dated 
May 8th 2006 informing him that based on a careful review of 
your file, they have determined that the grievance filed on 
your behalf is not meritorious and therefore should not 
proceed to arbitration.4 
3
 Maltsev testified that the discussion took place on August 21, 2006 which is confirmed 
by his September 6, 2006 letter to Anderson. In contrast, Anderson was unable to 
recall, during his testimony, the date of their conversation. 
4
 In his exceptions, Maltsev includes a chronology of purported events between October 
16, 2006 and the filing of his charge. However, the evidence in the record is 
inconsistent with the chronology. 
DISCUSSION 
In his exceptions, Maltsev challenges the ALJ's conclusion that he lacks standing 
to pursue the charge, pursuant to §209-a.2(c) of the Act, because he is no longer a 
public employee. 
1. Standing 
Pursuant to §209-a.2(c),JtJs anJmproper-practice for an_employee-organization -
"to breach its duty of fair representation to public employees under this article." The 
term "public employee" is defined in §201.7(a) of the Act as "any person holding a 
position by appointment or employment in the services of a public employer...." In 
Greece Central School District, et al,5 the Board dismissed a duty of fair representation 
charge alleging that an employee organization had failed to respond to a request by 
retirees to file a grievance seeking a leave credit benefit, under a collectively negotiated 
agreement, on the ground that the charging parties were not public employees, 
pursuant to 209-a.2(c) of the Act, because they had voluntarily and permanently 
severed their employment relationship. Subsequently, in Westchester County 
Correction Officers' Benevolent Association (Bartolini),6 the Board emphasized that: 
When an employee's employment relationship is severed, 
the union's representation duties to that former employee 
end, except in circumstances in which the severance from 
employment is being contested or there is some other basis 
upon which to conclude that there is a continuing nexus to 
employment notwithstanding the individual's relinquishment 
5
 28 PERB 1T3048 (1995), confd sub nom., 29 PERB fl7003 (Albany County 1996). See 
also, County of Dutchess and Dutchess County Deputy Sheriffs' PBA, 31 PERB P068 
(1998). 
630PERBp075(1997). 
or loss of employment. 
The Appellate Division, Third Department in Baker v. Board of Education, 
Hoosick Falls Central School District,8 applying our standards for standing under §201-
a.2(c) of the Act, held that retirees stated a cause of action for a breach of the duty of 
fair representation against an employee organization for allegedly excluding them from 
retroactive-salary_increases for_a periodJ«henJhey__were still employed—ln.reinstating 
the complaint, the Third Department stated: 
In our view, there is a continuing nexus between a retiree's 
former employment and negotiations over terms and 
conditions that will be retroactively applied to those periods 
of active employment. We conclude, therefore, that the 
Association had a continuing duty to represent plaintiffs in 
negotiations for the new retroactive CBA.9 
In the present case, Maltsev retired from employment with NYCTA a few days 
following the filing of the grievance by DC 37 challenging NYCTA's delays in responding 
to his suggestions and appeals. It is undisputed that Maltsev voluntarily ended his 
employment with NYCTA and the subject matter of the grievance does not relate in any 
manner to the circumstances under which he severed his employmentrelationship. 
However, we conclude that there is a nexus between Maltsev's grievance and his 
period of active employment with NYCTA. It was during his employment that Maltsev 
submitted his numerous suggestions and appeals which, arguably, may have entitled 
him ultimately to compensation in the form of a monetary award under NYCTA's 
730PERBat3184. 
8
 3 AD3d 678, 37 PERB ^7502 (3d Dept 2004). 
9 3 AD 3d at 681. r ";' 
employee suggestion policy. Although the grievance does not seek negotiated 
compensation or benefits for the period during which he was employed, the Board has 
previously recognized that an employee organization's duty of fair representation can 
extend to non-contractual issues that are job related and which directly affect an 
employee's compensation and other terms and conditions of employment.10 
Therefore, we reverse the ALJ's conclusion that Maltsev lacked standing to 
pursue his charge. 
We next turn to the exceptions challenging the ALJ's alternative bases for 
dismissing the charge: lack of merit and untimeliness. 
2. DC 37's Decision to Not Proceed to Arbitration 
It is well-settled that an employee organization is entitled to a wide range of 
reasonable discretion in the processing of grievances under the Act.11 In the present 
y case, DC 37 processed the grievance through the three step grievance procedure but 
decided against filing a demand for arbitration. This decision was made based on an 
evaluation by DC 37's Legal Department and it is well within broad range of discretion 
granted to an employee organization under the Act. Furthermore, a review of the 
explicitterms of the employee suggestion policy establishes that Maltsev's suggestions 
and appeals do not give rise to a claim for a monetary award against NYCTA. NYCTA 
retains final and binding authority under the policy to determine whether to use a 
suggestion or whether to issue a monetary award for an adopted suggestion: 
10
 UFT (Barnett), 14 PERB fl3017 (1981). 
11
 Rochester Teachers Assoc (Danna), 41 PERB P003 (2008); PEF (Frisch), 29 PERB 
13019(1996); District Council 37, AFSCME (Gonzalez),28 PERB 1J3062 (1995). 
In the alternative, we affirm the ALJ's dismissal of Maltsev's charge challenging 
DC 37's decision, as untimely pursuant to §204.1 (a)(1) of the Rules, because the 
charge was filed over four months after Maltsev received the DC 37 Legal Department 
memorandum indicating that the grievance would not be processed to arbitration.12 His 
subsequent unsuccessful effort to communicate with DC 37 representatives about the 
grievance does not toll the four month period to file a charge under the Rules.13 
Therefore, we affirm the ALJ's dismissal of Maltsev's charge claiming DC 37 
violated its duty of fair representation by refusing to process the grievance to arbitration. 
Finally, we consider Maltsev's exceptions challenging the.ALJ's dismissal of his 
allegations that DC 37 failed to respond to his inquiries about the grievance. 
3. DC 37's Alleged Failure to Respond to Inquiries 
As the Board stated in United Federation of Teachers (Grassel):u 
A request for information or appeal of an employee 
organization's decision, if not merely redundant and/or 
onerous, is deserving of a response, and the absence of one 
at least establishes a charge to the extent of requiring the 
presentation by the employee organization of an explanation 
for its failure to respond.15 
An employee organization is obligated, under the Act, to respond to a request for 
information within a reasonable period of time under the facts and circumstances of 
12
 NYCTA (Sayad), 28 PERB 1J3070 (1995); Buffalo Teachers' Fed (Boyar), 29 PERB 
1J3006 (1996). : .!:,_._...-,_ 
13
 New York State Thruway Auth, 40 PERB 1J30-14 (2007); City ofElmira, 41 PERB 
tf3018(2008). 
14
 23 PERB TJ3042 (1990). 
15
 2 3 P E R B a t 3 0 8 4 . - -.—.-..-. • -;T 
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each particular case.16 
Like all other improper practice charges, however, a charge alleging that an 
employee organization has refused or failed to respond to a reasonable request must 
be filed within four months from when the charging party knew or should have known of 
the alleged violation of the Act.17 
—in-the-presentreaserwe affirm the AbJ^s dismissal of-MaltsevVallegations-with— 
respect to DC 37's alleged failure to respond to his inquiries as untimely pursuant to 
§204.1 (a)(1) of the Rules. On September 7, 2006, Maffeo advised Maltsev that he 
should proceed with his complaint about DC 37's alleged failure to respond to his 
inquiries. We conclude that upon receipt of this advice from Maffeo. on September 7, 
2006, Maltsev knew or should have known that DC 37 may have violated the Act by 
failing to respond to his inquiries. Therefore, we conclude that the charge, filed following 
receipt of Anderson's January 25, 2007 letter, is untimely. 
WE, THEREFORE, ORDER that the improper practice charge must be, and 
hereby is, dismissed in its entirety. 
DATED: September 24, 2008 
Albany, New York 
Robert S'. Hite, Member 
16
 Nassau Educ Chapter CSEA, Inc. (Marinoff), 11 PERB j[3010 (1978); UFT 
(Freedman), 33 PERBp062 (2000); PEF_(St, George),18 PERB_JI3005 (1985). 
17
 Buffalo Teachers' Fed (Boyar), supra, note 12. 
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TRIBOROUGH BRIDGE AND TUNNEL 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
On September 22, 2008, the Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority Superior 
Officers Benevolent Association (SOBA) and the Bridge and Tunnel Officer's 
Benevolent Association (BTOBA) filed a joint motion, pursuant to §212.4(h) of the Rules 
of Procedure (Rules), for leave to file exceptions challenging pre-hearing rulings of an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) denying their respective requests for issuance of 
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subpoenas duces tecum and denying a request by BTOBA to adjourn the hearing 
scheduled to commence on September 25, 2008. The Triborough Bridge and Tunnel 
Authority (TBTA) opposes the motion. 
FACTS ^ ^ 
On or about January 2, 2008, SOBA filed an improper practice charge alleging 
that TBTA violated §209-a.1(d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) by 
posting a job vacancy notice for a civilian Security Operations Center Operator position 
in TBTA's Internal Security Department. The gravamen of SOBA's charge is that the 
duties set forth in the job description for the Security Operations Center Operator 
x position constitute exclusive SOBA bargaining unit work. 
i . . . . . . . 
. / • • . . . . . . . . . 
On or about January 4, 2008, BTOBA filed a similar improper practice charge 
alleging that TBTA violated §§209-a.1 (a) and (d) of the Act on the grounds that the job 
description for the Security Operations Center Operator position includes duties 
exclusively performed by BTOBA's bargaining unit. 
TBTA filed answers to both improper practice charges denying that it violated the 
Act and alleging, inter alia, that the charges are untimely. 
On July 7, 2008, the parties were sent a notice consolidating the cases for a 
hearing on September 25, 2008 before an ALJ. On August 25, 2008, BTOBA filed a 
request to the ALJ, pursuant to §211.3 of the Rules, for issuance of an agency 
subpoena duces tecum to be served on TBTA requiring the production of seven 
;; categories of documents: The affidavit in support of BTOBA's proposed subpoena 
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states that: 
(2) The documents requested pursuant to the Subpoena 
is needed to be able to establish that the work to be 
performed by people to be employed as security 
operations center operator in the Internal Security 
Department is the same that have been performed by 
_____ the_members_of_the_charging^party. 
(4) All of the documents requested are relevant to the 
issue as contained in the charge. 
On September 9, 2008, the ALJ issued a ruling denying BTOBA's request for the 
issuance of an agency subpoena, concluding that the request did not comply with the 
Rules because the affidavit in support of the request did not set forth facts establishing 
the relevancy of the materials sought to be produced. 
\ On September 15, 2008, SOBA filed its own request to the ALJ, pursuant to 
§211.3 of the Rules, for issuance of an agency subpoena duces tecum to be served on 
TBTA seeking substantially similar documents to those sought in BTOBA's proposed 
subpoena. The affidavit in support of SOBA's proposed subpoena states that: 
2. The documents requested are needed because the 
Charging party [sic] needs to establish: a) the work 
was exclusively performed by SOBA members; and 
b) that the positions that were posted to non-
bargaining unit members contain job tasks and duties 
(work) that are "substantially similar" to work currently 
being done by SOBA members. 
3. The requested documents are relevant to this issue. 
The ALJ denied SOBA's request in a ruling, dated September 16, 2008, In her 
ruling, the ALJ found that SOBA had failed to demonstrate good cause for its 
~ submission of an untimely request for a subpoena. In addition, the ALJ concluded that 
") 
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SOBA failed to set forth sufficient facts to establish the relevancy of the documents 
sought and that the requested subpoena was overbroad. 
One day following the ALJ's denial of SOBA's request, BTOBA renewed its 
request for issuance of an agency subpoena through the filing of a supplemental 
affidavit with the ALJ along with a cover letter suggesting that the hearing may need to 
be adjourned. Although BTOBA's supplemental affidavit substantially modified its 
original request, the ALJ denied BTOBA's renewed request as well as its request for an 
adjournment. 
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE EXCEPTIONS 
In support of their joint motion for leave to file exceptions, SOBA and BTOBA 
^ contend that extraordinary circumstances exist warranting the Board to grant their joint 
motion. The purported extraordinary circumstances cited by SOBA and BTOBA in 
support of their motion are: a) TBTA is unilaterally transferring work duties to non-
bargaining unit civilian employees; b) the ALJ denied requests by SOBA and BTOBA 
for issuance of agency subpoenas duces tecum; c) SOBA and BTOBA need the 
subpoenaed documents to establish the extreme safety sensitive nature of the duties 
being reassigned to non-bargaining unit employees; d) the ALJ denied BTOBA's 
request for an adjournment; e) the ALJ's denial of the requests for subpoenas and the 
denial of the request for an adjournment will result in prejudice to SOBA and BTOBA. 
TBTA opposes the joint motion for leave to file exceptions. 
DISCUSSION 
Section 212.4(h) of the Rules states, in relevant part, thatr 
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All motions and rulings made at the hearing shall be part of 
the record of the proceeding, and unless expressly 
authorized by the board, shall not be appealed directly to 
the board, but shall be considered by the board whenever 
the case is submitted to it for decision. 
It is well settled that the Board will not grant leave to file exceptions to non-final 
rulings and decisions unless the moving party demonstrates extraordinary 
circumstances.1 In State of New York (Unified Court System)2 the Board refused to 
grant leave to file exceptions to an ALJ's denial of a request for the issuance of a 
subpoena when the moving party failed to demonstrate extraordinary circumstances, 
such as severe prejudice, resulting from the denial. 
The rationale for the extraordinary circumstances standard is the Board's 
^ recognition that it is far more efficient to await a final disposition of the merits of a 
charge before examining an ALJ's interim determinations. In addition, the granting of 
interlocutory relief results in unnecessary delays in the final resolution of the factual and 
legal issues raised by an improper practice charge. Therefore, the Board has 
consistently rejected most requests for permission to file exceptions, especially motions 
seeking review of interim rulings in improper practice cases. 
In the present cases, SOBA and BTOBA seek leave to file exceptions 
1
 Mt Morris Cent Sen Dist, 26 PERB 1J3085 (1993); Greenburgh No 11 Union Free Sen 
Dist, 28 PERB 1J3034 (1995); Town of Shawangunk, 29 PERB 1J3050 (1996); New York 
State Housing Finance Agency, 30 PERB 1J3022 (1997); Council 82, AFSCME, 32 
PERB 1T3040 (1999); Watertown City Sch Dist 32 PERB 1J3022 (1999): UFT (Grassel), 
j 32 PERB 1J3071 (1999); City ofNewburgh, 33 PERB 1J3031 (2000); State of New York 
(Division of Parole), 40 PERB 1J3007 (2007). 
! ••;- 2 36 PERB Tf3031 (2003). • •";• • ~ 
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challenging the ALJ's denial of their respective requests for issuance of agency 
subpoenas. In support of their motion for leave, SOBA and BTOBA have failed to 
demonstrate extraordinary circumstances, such as severe prejudice, warranting the 
grant of interlocutory review of the denial of their requests for subpoenas. 
Pursuant to §211.1 of the Rules, an ALJ has the discretion to grant or deny a 
request for the issuance of an agency subpoena.3 In the present cases, the ALJ denied 
the requests for the issuance of agency subpoenas based, in part, on the failure of 
SOBA and BTOBA to submit affidavits containing facts sufficient to establish the 
relevancy of the materials sought to be produced consistent with §211.3(c)(2) of the 
Rules. We conclude that the ALJ's denials of the requests for subpoenas do not 
constitute extraordinary circumstances, at this juncture in the present cases, for the 
granting of interlocutory review. 
Similarly, we deny SOBA and BTOBA's request that the Board grant interlocutory 
review of the ALJ's denial of BTOBA's request for an adjournment. Section 212.4(b) of 
the Rules states: 
The hearing will not be adjourned unless good and sufficient 
grounds are established by the requesting party, who shall 
file with the administrative law judge an original and three 
copies of the application, on notice to all other parties, 
setting forth the factual circumstances of the application and 
the previously ascertained position of the other parties to the 
application. The failure of a party to appear at the hearing 
may, in the discretion of the administrative law judge, 
constitute ground for dismissal of the absent nanVs 
pleading. 
3
 Nanuet Union Free Sch Dist, 17 PERB P005 (1984); Oswego City Sch Dist, 25 PERB 
113052(1992). 
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In its September 17, 2008 letter to the ALJ, BTOBA stated that if TBTA were 
unable to supply the subpoenaed documents in advance of the hearing an adjournment 
may be necessary. In light of the ALJ's denial of BTOBA's request for a subpoena, the 
sole rationale given for the requested adjournment has become moot. In their joint 
motion for interlocutory review, SOBA and BTOBA fail to establish that they have been 
or would be prejudiced by the ALJ's denial of the requested adjournment and 
consequently have failed to demonstrate extraordinary circumstances. 
Based upon the foregoing, we deny SOBA and BTOBA's joint motion for leave to 
file exceptions and remand the cases to the ALJ for further processing consistent with 
this decision. 
SO ORDERED. 
DATED: September 24, 2008 
Albany, New York 
Jerome Lefkowitz, Chairman 
Robert S. Hite, Member 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to the Board on exceptions filed by Ronald Grassel (Grassel) to 
a decision by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissing an improper practice 
charge, alleging that the Board of Education of the City School District of the City of 
New York (District) violated §209-a.1(a) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act 
(Act), on the grounds that Grassel had failed to satisfy his burden of proof 
demonstrating that the District violated the Act. 
The improper practice charge, as amended, alleges that the District violated 
§209-a.1(a) of the Act when it failed to reinstate Grassel following the District's March 1, 
Case No. U-27502 -2-
2007 withdrawal of pending Educ Law §3020-a disciplinary charges.1 
Over a month following the close of the record, Grassel made a motion to amend the 
charge to include allegations that the District had issued new disciplinary charges against 
him and to reopen the record for the purpose of admitting additional evidence into the record. 
The ALJ denied the motion. 
_. ___ ^EXCEPTIONS- _ , 
In his exceptions, Grassel contends that the ALJ erred in dismissing the charge 
contending that the District's delay in reinstating him was in retaliation for a grievance he filed 
on or about June 13, 1997. In addition, Grassel asserts that the ALJ erred in denying his 
motion to amend the charge and to reopen the record. Finally, Grassel excepts to the ALJ 
accepting the District's post-hearing brief although it was filed two days following the due 
date for such briefs. 
^ . : . • ' . . . . . . . . . . 
The District supports the ALJ's decision and asserts that Grassel's exceptions are 
procedurally defective pursuant to §213.2 of the Rules. 
Based upon our review of the record and consideration of the parties' arguments, we 
reject the District's procedural objections to the exceptions, deny Grassel's exceptions and 
affirm the ALJ's dismissal of the charge. 
11n his original charge, Grassel also alleged violations of §§2Q9-a.2(a) and (c) of the Act 
by the United Federation of Teachers (UFT). The Director of Public Employment 
Practices and Representation (Director) found the allegations against UFT to be 
deficient and they were, therefore, not processed pursuant to §204.2 of the Rules of 
Procedure (Rules). • 
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FACTS 
The relevant facts are set forth in the ALJ's decision.2 The facts are repeated here 
only as necessary to address the exceptions. 
In 1997, Grassel worked at the Harry Van Arsdale, Jr. High School. In response to 
the distribution of a weekly calendar, Grassel sent the assistant principal a memorandum, 
datedJ.anuary_1_7,199I,_complainingJhat empioyeejDrganization_pamphlets had been 
removed from a classroom bulletin board. Following a June 1997 incident between Grassel 
and the high school principal, the principal requested the local superintendent to have 
Grassel examined to determine whether he is medically fit to perform his job duties. In 
letters, dated November 7, 1997, December 23, 1997, July 3, 1998, July 24, 1998 and June 
29, 2006, the District directed Grassel to report to the District's Medical Bureau for a 
medical examination pursuant to Educ Law §2568. 
As a result of his repeated failure to appear or contact the Medical Bureau, the 
District informed Grassel, by letter dated February 4, 1998, that he was being removed 
from the payroll. Grassel's legal challenge to this action by the District was unsuccessful. 
In affirming the grant of summary judgment against Grassel, the Appellate Division, 
Second Department stated: 
The sole reason that he was precluded from teaching was 
his own failure to comply with the Board's reasonable 
directives. Under such circumstances, the Board should not 
241 PERB 1J4541 (2008). We have also considered the factual conclusions reached by 
the Appellate Division, Second Department, in Grassel v Bd of Educ of the City of New 
York, 301 AD2d 498 (2d Dept 2003), when it affirmed summary judgment against 
Grassel, as well as, the factual conclusions contained in an arbitration opinion and 
award, dated April 4, 2005, finding Grassel guilty of certain Educ Law §3020-a 
disciplinary charges and the decision by Kings County Supreme Court Justice Lewis 
Bart Stone, dated March 15, 2006, which vacated a proviso from the remedy issued by 
the arbitration panel. Joint Exhibits l and 2. 
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be compelled to pay the plaintiff.3 
In the late 1990s, the District issued multiple disciplinary charges against 
Grassel, pursuant to Educ Law §3020-a, seeking his termination. The charges set forth 
20 specifications alleging that he was unfit to teach, he was insubordinate to his 
supervisors and he lacked concern for the students. Following a multi-day hearing, an 
arbitration panel issued an_opinion and award, dated April A,_2005, findingJSrassel guilty 
of certain allegations and imposing the following remedy: 
As a remedy for the Specifications that the Department 
proved the Respondent is guilty, the period of time that the 
Respondent has been suspended without pay shall be 
deemed to be a disciplinary suspension in full satisfaction of 
such action by the Respondent. The Department shall 
reinstate the Respondent forthwith subject to the 
Respondent's satisfactory resolution of any currently 
pending medical examination issue.4 
Thereafter, Grassel commenced a special proceeding seeking an order vacating 
the arbitration opinion and award. On March 16, 2006, Justice Lewis Bart Stone issued 
a decision and order vacating the remedial portion of the arbitration award to the extent 
that it conditioned Grassel's reinstatement on the "satisfactory resolution of any current 
pending medical examination issue." 
Subsequently, the District issued new Educ Law §3020-a disciplinary charges 
and specifications against Grassel premised on a continuing failure to submit to a 
medical examination. On March 1, 2007, before disciplinary hearing officer Joshua 
Javits, the District and UFT counsel, representing Grassel, entered into a stipulation on 
the record. Pursuant to the stipulation, the District agreed, to withdraw the pending Educ 
3Grassel vBd ofEduc of the City ofNewYork, 301 AD2d at 499. 
4
 Joint Exhibit 1, p. 105. 
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Law §3020-a disciplinary charges "with prejudice." During a colloquy between counsel, 
with respect to the terms of the withdrawal, it was agreed that that if the District decided 
to proceed with additional disciplinary charges against Grassel, those charges would 
not be premised upon the 1997 and 1998 directives for him to be medically examined or 
anything determined in the April 4, 2005 arbitration award.5 In addition, the District's 
xounseLmade clearLthat although the disciplinary.charges were being withdrawn,he-did. 
not have the authority to reinstate Grassel and that any decision with respect to 
reinstatement would be made by other District representatives.6 
Following Grassel's receipt of the hearing transcript on March 7, 2007, he spoke 
with Superintendent Graham (Graham) on March 14, 2007. During that conversation, 
Graham stated that he was unfamiliar with the March 1, 2007 transcript and unaware of 
what happened at the hearing. 
Later, in March 2007, Grassel met with the District's Deputy Director for Human 
Resources Bernard Palmer (Palmer) about his reinstatement. At the meeting, Grassel 
presented Palmer with a copy of the transcript. Prior to reading the transcript, Palmer 
did not have any information as to what took place at the disciplinary-hearing. During 
their meeting, Palmer explained that he needed to consult with both the District's 
counsel and Graham. Palmer explained, during his testimony, that consultation with the 
District's counsel was particularly necessary due to his lack of familiarity with the import 
of a stipulation contained in the transcript. Following Palmer's consultation with 
counsel,.he sent a letter to Grassel informing Grassel thathe is being reassigned to the 
Harry Van Arsdale High School, effective June 25, 2007, and that he should report to 
5
 Joint Exhibit 7, pp. 3-4. 
6
 Joint Exhibit 7, p. 5. 
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the high school's principal on that date. 
DISCUSSION 
At the outset, we examine the District's procedural arguments challenging 
Grassel's exceptions. Contrary to the District's claim, we find Grassel's exceptions to 
be in substantial compliance with §213.2 of the Rules. The exceptions do contain 
:_^_;certain_citationsJo the^record which are_s_ufficJentJo^meBfJhe_rB.qnire.ments_of_§213..2_o.f_ 
the Rules. 
In addition, we conclude that Grassel's exceptions are timely. Based upon a 
review of our records, we find that Grassel received a copy of the ALJ's decision only 
after it was remailed to him and his exceptions were filed with the Board within 15 
working days following the remailing. 
We next turn to Grassel's exceptions challenging the ALJ's denial of his motion 
to amend the charge and reopen the record, along with his exception challenging the 
ALJ's acceptance of the District's post-hearing brief. 
Pursuant to §204.1 (d) of the Rules, an ALJ is granted considerable discretion to 
grant or deny a request to amend an improper practice charge before, during or after 
the conclusion of a hearing so long as the decision is consistent with the principles of 
due process.7 Similarly, whether or not to grant a request to reopen a record is subject 
to the ALJ's discretion.8 Finally, §212.5 of the Rules grants an ALJ the discretion to 
determine when post-hearing briefs are due and whether or not to permit reply or " 
7
 Villane nf.lnhnSnn CM\/ 19 PFRR ^3090 MQ7QV / IFT Mi/P7/I 32 PFRR ITSORQ MQQC^ 
8
 County of Nassau, 18 PERB1J3076 (1985); County of Nassau, 35 PERB P045 
(2002), confirmed sub nom., CSEA v New York State Pub EmpI Rel Bd, 2 AD3d 1197, 
' " 3 6 PERB 117019 (2003). "'""~ 
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supplemental briefs. 
In the present case, we conclude that the ALJ did not abuse her discretion in 
denying Grassel's motion to amend the charge to allege a new set of facts based upon 
the new disciplinary charges issued against Grassel and to reopen the record for the 
introduction of additional evidence. As the ALJ correctly concluded, permitting an 
amendmentand a reopening oLthe_recordjn thepresentcase_w_o_u.l.d result in a n „ _ ^ 
unnecessary delay in the final resolution of the charge. Moreover, Grassel could have 
filed a new improper proper practice charge if he believed that the District violated the 
Act by issuing new disciplinary charges. 
Similarly, we conclude that the ALJ did not abuse her discretion in accepting the 
District's tardily filed post-hearing brief. An ALJ has the discretion, under §212.5 of the 
Rules, to determine the due date for post-hearing briefs. There is nothing in the record 
to establish or even suggest that the ALJ abused her discretion. Grassel had not been 
prejudiced by the two-day delay and the ALJ had granted him an opportunity to file a 
reply brief. 
Finally, we examine Grassel's exceptions challenging the ALJ's determination 
that Grassel failed to satisfy his burden of proof by presenting evidence establishing that 
the District violated §209-a. 1(a) of the Act. 
As we recently reiterated in United Federation of Teachers (Jenkins),9 a charging 
party in an improper practice charge; alleging unlawfully motivated interference in , 
violation of §209-a.1 (a) of the Act, has the burden of proof to demonstrate by a 
preponderance of evidence that: a) the charging party engaged in protected activity 
941 PERB p007 (2008). - - - - - - - r - - . •— - _ - : - - - , - - - — - -
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under the Act; b) such activity was known to the person or persons taking the 
employment action; and c) the employment action would not have been taken "but for" 
the protected activity.10 An employer's unlawful motivation can be proven through direct 
or circumstantial evidence. 
If an inference of unlawful motivation is established through circumstantial 
evidence, the burden of persuasion shifts to the respondent to rebut the inference by ___'_ 
presenting evidence demonstrating that the employment action or conduct was 
motivated by a legitimate non-discriminatory business reason.11 If the respondent 
establishes a legitimate non-discriminatory reason, then the burden of persuasion shifts 
back to the charging party to establish that the articulated non-discriminatory reason is 
pretextual.12 However, the burden of proof rests, at all times, "with the charging party to 
establish the requisite causation under the Act by a preponderance of evidence."13 
In the present case, Grassel asserts that the District violated §209-a.1(a) of the 
Act by delaying his reinstatement from March 1, 2007, when the District stipulated to the 
withdrawal of the pending disciplinary charges "with prejudice," to June 25, 2007, when 
he was assigned to the Harry Van Arsdale, Jr. High School in retaliation for protected 
activity ten years earlier. 
The record demonstrates that Grassel presents sufficient evidence to establish the 
first two elements of a prima facie case of unlawful interference in violation of §209-a.1(a) 
10
 City of Salamanca,18 PERB P012 (1985); Town of Independence, 23 PERB P020 
(1990); County of Orleans, 25 PERB P010 (1992); Stockbridge Valley Cent Sch Dist, 
26 PERB 113007(2000); County of Wyoming, 34 PERB fi3042 (2001). 
11
 State of New York (SUNYat Buffalo), 33 PERB 1J3020 (2000). 
12
 Supra, notes 10. 11 and 12. 
13
 UFT (Jenkins), 41 PERB at 3044. 
of the Act: he engaged in protected activity when he sent his January 17, 1997 
memorandum to the high school assistant principal complaining about anti-union animus in 
a classroom and when he was represented by UFT at the March 1, 2007 hearing with 
respect to the disciplinary charges; and the District was aware of this protected activity. 
However, Grassel does not present sufficient evidence to meet the third element 
of his prima facie case establishing an inference of improper District motivation. The 
ten years between his 1997 memorandum to the assistant principal and the District's 
alleged adverse action is too long a period of time, under the facts and circumstances of 
the present case, to create an inference of improper motivation. The 1997 grievance, 
referenced by Grassel in his exceptions, is not in the record. Therefore, we are unable 
to conclude what probative value, if any, the 1997 grievance has in establishing an 
inference of improper motivation 
In addition, we conclude that the delay between the March 1,2007 stipulation 
and Grassel's June 25, 2007 assignment is insufficient to establish an inference of 
unlawful motivation.14 The March 1, 2007 transcript reveals that the District's counsel 
expressly stated that Grassel would not be reinstated that day because the attorney did 
not have the authority to reinstate and that the decision to reinstate would be made by 
other District representatives. There is no evidence in the record establishing that either 
Palmer or Graham was present at the disciplinary hearing; nor is there evidence 
establishing when the District first informed each of them about the terms and meaning 
14
 In his exceptions, Grassel did not argue that UFT representation during the 
disciplinary hearing constituted protected activity under the Act. Therefore, the issue is 
waived. Rules, §213.2(b)(4); Town ofOrangetown, 40 PERB 1J3008 (2007). However, 
even if we considered UFT representation of Grassel as constituting protected activity 
the evidence in the record remains insufficient to establish unlawful District motivation. 
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of the stipulation. In fact, during his testimony, Grassel admitted that he did not learn of 
the stipulation until after he received the transcript in the mail on March 7, 2007, and 
when he discussed the transcript with Graham on March 14, 2007, Graham told him 
that he was unfamiliar with it. Therefore, under the facts and circumstances presented 
in the present case, we conclude that the delay in reinstating Grassel is insufficient to 
establish an inference of unlawful motivation. __^ 
We also reject Grassel's related contention that the March 1, 2007 stipulation, 
which contains a "with prejudice" withdrawal of the pending discrimination charges, 
constitutes evidence that the District violated §209-a.1 (a) of the Act. The transcript 
reveals that although the District stipulated that it was withdrawing the pending 
disciplinary charges "with prejudice," the colloquy between counsel makes clear that the 
stipulation was limited to the District agreeing not to bring future disciplinary charges 
'•' based on the directives given to Grassel in 1997 and 1998 and the disciplinary issues 
resolved by the arbitration panel. The stipulation did not bar the District from filing 
future disciplinary charges premised on other alleged conduct by Grassel or from 
following its administrative practices with respect to reinstatements. 
In the alternative, even if we were to conclude that the delay in Grassel's 
reinstatement, following the March 1, 2007 stipulation, constituted circumstantial 
evidence sufficient to shift the burden of persuasion, we conclude that Palmer's 
testimony about his initial unawareness of the stipulation, combined with his need to 
consult with District counsel, constituted sufficient evidence of a non-discriminatory 
reason for the delay, a reason that Grassel failed to rebut. 
Finally, we deny Grassel's exception premised on his contention that the District 
uase NO. U-Z/'DUZ - i i-
allegedly reinstated him without pay. The ALJ concluded that the issue of Grassel's pay 
status following his reinstatement is not a part of his improper practice charge. In fact, 
Grassel raised his pay status for the first time during his cross-examination of Palmer, 
and, during his rebuttal testimony failed to present credible evidence contradicting 
Palmer's testimony that Grassel's reinstatement on June 25, 2007 was with pay. 
WE, THEREFORE, ORDER that the improper practice charge must be, and 
hereby is, denied in its entirety. 
DATED: September 24, 2008 
Albany, New York 
/I Jerome L^rrkowi^/Chairman 
~* • Robert S'. Hite, Member 
) ' • ' ; • ; • ' • ' • . : . 
